« From the Courts » Open DEMAT Account in 24 hrs  Karnataka High Court restrains Bengaluru-based Institute of Chartered Tax Practitioners India from enrolling candidates for its courses  Attachment on Cash Credit of Assessee under GST Act: Delhi HC directs Bank to Comply Instructions to Vacate  Income Tax Addition Made Towards Unsubstantiated Share Capital Is Eligible For Section 80-IC Deduction: Delhi High Court  Inordinate delay in income tax appeal hearings  Income Tax leviable on Tuition Fee in the Year of Rendering of Services: ITAT  Supreme Court invoked its power under Article 142 of Constitution to validate notices issued under section 148 as notices issued under section 148A. However the same shall be subject to amended provisions of section 149.  ITAT refuses to stay tax demand on former owner of Raw Pressery brand  Bombay HC sets aside rejection of refund claims by GST authorities  [Income Tax Act] Faceless Assessment Scheme does not take away right to personal hearing: Delhi High Court  Rajasthan High Court directs GST Authority to Unblock Input Tax Credit availed in Electronic Credit Ledger  Sebi-taxman fight over service tax dues reaches Supreme Court «  Ganesh Housing Corporation Ltd vs. DCIT (Gujarat High Court)... Connectivity of jails, court within fortnight, UT & BSNL... » N.K. Bajpai vs. UOI (Supreme Court) March, 16th 2012 S. 129(6) of Customs Act barring ex-Members from practise before CESTAT is valid   The appellant was appointed Member (Technical) of CEGAT on 1.11.1990 and demitted office on 7.3.1993. He enrolled as an advocate with the Bar Council of India on 18.4.1993. S. 129 (6) of the Customs Act, 1962 introduced by FA 2003 debarred ex-Members from appearing, acting or pleading before the CEGAT/ CESTAT. S. 129(6) was challenged before the High Court on the ground that (i) it was ultra vires Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India & (ii) could not apply to persons who had demitted office before the insertion of the provision. The High Court (P.C. Jain vs. UOI) rejected the plea on the ground that the restriction was to remove a perceived bias and was not unreasonable. On appeal to the Supreme Court, HELD dismissing the appeal:   (i) As regards the constitutional challenge, while the right to practice as an advocate is not only a statutory right under the Advocates Act but is also a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, it is subject to reasonable restrictions. The restriction imposed by s. 129(6) of the Customs Act is constitutional because (i) the restriction is partial to the extent of practice before CESTAT and does not bar practice before other judicial bodies & (ii) the restriction is intended to serve a larger public interest and to uplift the professional values and standards of advocacy in the country. It adds to public confidence in the administration of justice by the Tribunal;   (ii) The contention that the restriction is based on an illogical presumption of likelihood of bias is also not acceptable because when one has been a member of a Tribunal over a long period and other members have been his co-members, it is difficult to hold that there would be no possibility of bias or no real danger of bias. Even if this possibility was ruled out, it is still in the interest of the institution that restrictions are enforced. Then alone will the mind of the litigant be free from a lurking doubt of likelihood of bias and this would enhance the image of the Tribunal;   (iii) The contention that s. 129(6) cannot be given effect to retrospectively so as to adversely affect persons who were enrolled as advocates when the provision was not on the statute book is not acceptable because there is a distinction between a law being enforced retrospectively and a law that operates retroactively. The restriction in the present case is one where the right to practice before a limited forum is being taken away in presenti while leaving all other forums open for practice. Though the restriction has the effect of relating back to a date prior to the presenti, the law stricto sensu is not retrospective, but is retroactive. The restriction does not interfere with settled or vested rights.