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Commissioner Of Income Tax Vs. I.T.C. Limited
July, 27th 2017
$~
*     IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
R-9 to 24

+       ITA 73/2005, ITA 75/2005, ITA 77/2005, ITA 78/2005,
        ITA 79/2005, ITA 80/2005, ITA 81/2005, ITA 82/2005,
        ITA 86/2005, ITA 100/2005, ITA 113/2005, ITA 123/2005
        ITA 200/2005, ITA 561/2005 & CM APPL. Nos. 10469/2005 &
        10470/2005, ITA 633/2005, ITA 688/2005 & CM APPL.
        11621/2005

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX                    ..... Appellant
            Through: Mr. Zoheb Hossain, Senior Standing
                     Counsel with Mr. Deepak Anand, Junior
                     Standing Counsel in ITA Nos.73/2005;
                     75/2005; 77/2005; 78/2005; 79/2005;
                     80/2005; 81/2005; 82/2005; 86/2005;
                     100/2005; 113/2005; 123/2005;
                     200/2005.
                     Mr. Asheesh Jain, Senior Standing
                     Counsel with Mr. Vikrant A.
                     Maheshwari, Advocate in ITA
                     Nos.561/2005633/2005; 688/2005.

                                             versus

I.T.C. LIMITED                                                     .... Respondent
                          Through:          Mr. Ajay Vohra, Senior Advocate with
                                            Ms. Kavita Jha & Mr. Bhuwan
                                            Dhoopar, Advocates.

CORAM:
JUSTICE S.MURALIDHAR
JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH

                                          ORDER
%                                         04.07.2017
Dr. S. Muralidhar, J.:
1. These are 16 appeals by the Revenue under Section 260A of the
Income Tax Act, 1961 (`Act'). 8 of them are quantum appeals and the


ITA 73, 75, 77 to 82, 86, 100, 113, 123, 200, 561, 633 and 688 of 2005
                                                                         Page 1 of 15
remaining 8 are penalty appeals. As far as the quantum appeals are
concerned, these are ITA Nos. 73, 75, 77, 78, 82, 86, 113 and 123 of
2005 which are directed against the common order dated 16th March,
2004 passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (`ITAT') in ITA
(T.D.S.) Nos. 31 to 38/Del/2002 for the Financial Years (FYs) 1994-95
to 2001-2002. While admitting these appeals on 24th November, 2005,
this Court framed the following questions of law for consideration:
        i. Whether the ITAT was correct in law in holding that the amount
        paid by the Assessee to the Airport Authority of India for use of
        lounge premises by way of royalty was not tantamount to rent
        within the meaning of Section 194-I of the Income Tax Act?

        ii. Whether the ITAT was correct in law in holding that the
        interest under Section 201(1A) of the Act cannot be charged once
        the payee had paid the tax?

2. As far as the penalty appeals are concerned, these are ITA Nos. 79,
80, 81, 100, 200, 561, 633 and 688 of 2005 which are directed against
the common order dated 24th June, 2004 passed by the ITAT in ITA
Nos. 548 to 555/Del/2004 for the Assessment Years (`AYs') 1994-95 to
2001-2002. While admitting these appeals the following question of law
was framed by this Court:
        Whether the ITAT was correct in law in deleting the penalty
        under Section 271C of the Income Tax Act, 1961?

3. The facts in brief are that the Respondent/Assessee was awarded the
contract for running an Executive Lounge at the Indira Gandhi
International Airport, New Delhi (`IGI') by the Airports Authority of
India (`AAI'). As explained by the Assessee, the award of the contract
was preceded by a bidding process which commenced with a tender
being floated by the AAI. The successful bidder had to quote the royalty


ITA 73, 75, 77 to 82, 86, 100, 113, 123, 200, 561, 633 and 688 of 2005
                                                                         Page 2 of 15
amount it was prepared to pay for being granted license to operate the
executive lounge. The AAI was to fix the license fee for the space to be
provided to the successful bidder for operating the lounge.

4. A License Agreement (LA) was entered into on 23rd October, 1998
between the AAI and the Assessee in terms of which the premises at the
first floor of the IGI Airport, referred to as the 'lounge premises', was
given on license basis to the Assessee "for the purpose of operating an
Executive Lounge to all operating airlines for the benefit of their Transit
Passengers in the International Terminal." The period of license was
from 1st October, 1998 to 30th September, 2003.

5. As far as the license fee was concerned, Clauses 2(a) and 2(b) of the
LA provided as under:
        "2. (a) That the licensee will pay a sum of Rs. 6,25,000.00
        (Rupees Six lacs twenty five thousand only) every month in
        advance by way of Royalty for the first year of the contract, with
        the provision that the said royalty shall be subject to 10% annual
        compound escalation in the subsequent years of the contract and
        shall be paid in Advance on or before the 10th of each month.

        (b) In addition to the said royalty, the Licensee shall pay to the
        authority licencee fee for space allotted for operating the Lounge
        Premises at the rates as may be fixed from time to time. The
        licencee fee payable in respect of the Lounge premises shall be
        AAI and the licensee shall pay such revised licence fee. The area
        of the lounge premises is 230 sq. meters and the present licence
        fee is Rs. 402.62 per sq. meter per month."

6. A controversy arose regarding the failure on the Assessee's part to
deduct tax at source in terms of Section 194-I of the Act read with
Section 201(1) thereof from the payments made by it to AAI under the
LA. The stand taken by the Assessee was that the payment was not in


ITA 73, 75, 77 to 82, 86, 100, 113, 123, 200, 561, 633 and 688 of 2005
                                                                         Page 3 of 15
the nature of rent but in the nature of royalty.

7. By an order dated 29th January, 2002, which was common to FYs
1994-95 to 2001-2002, the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax,
Circle 50(1) (hereafter the Assessing Officer - AO) held that there has
been a failure by the Assessee to deduct tax at source from the rent
payments made to the AAI under the above LA. Accordingly, it was
held that the Assessee was deemed to be an Assessee in default to the
extent of non-deduction or short deduction of tax under Section 201(1)
of the Act. The total short deduction for the aforesaid FYs worked out to
Rs. 1,17,39,448. The interest thereon under Section 201(1A) of the Act
worked out to Rs. 61,80,971. Thus, the total demand worked out to Rs.
1,79,20,419. It was held that the mere fact that one part of the payment
under Clause 2(a) of the LA was termed as royalty "cannot take away
the character of payments being rent for the use of land and premises at
the Indira Gandhi International Airport in respect of International
Terminal."






8. Aggrieved by the above order, the Assessee went in appeal before the
Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) [`CIT(A)']. The CIT(A)
concurred with the Assessing Officer (`AO') as regards the payment
made to the AAI being rent under Section 194-I of the Act. As far as the
question of payment of interest under Section 201(1A) of the Act was
concerned, the CIT(A) was of the view that it required to be verified
from the AO who exercised jurisdiction over AAI whether, in fact, taxes
in respect of the payments made to it by the Assessee were already
remitted by it. In other words, it had to be seen whether the payments
had been included in the gross receipts of AAI on which tax had been


ITA 73, 75, 77 to 82, 86, 100, 113, 123, 200, 561, 633 and 688 of 2005
                                                                         Page 4 of 15
paid by AAI. The demand to that extent was deleted by the CIT(A)
subject to verification. It was held that the interest under Section
201(1A) of the Act had to be worked out with reference to the delay, if
any.

9. In the further appeals filed by the Assessee before the ITAT, the
Assessee relied on a certificate dated 28th January, 2004 issued by the
AAI wherein it was clarified that the royalty charged was not for the use
of building but for the right to carry on the business. Accordingly, it was
submitted that since the royalty was not for the use of land and premises
but only for the right to operate the lounge, it could not be regarded as
rent and there was, thus, no obligation on the Assessee to deduct tax at
source therefrom under Section 194-I of the Act.

10. As regards interest levied under Section 201(1A) of the Act was
concerned, the Assessee submitted before the ITAT that with AAI
having paid taxes on the income by way of royalty, there was no
question for levy of interest for the alleged default of non-deduction of
tax at source.

11. The Assessee's appeals were allowed by the ITAT by the impugned
order for the following reasons:
        "1. Under the Airports Authority Act of India, the AAI is obliged
        to, inter alia, `establish and maintain hotels, restaurant and
        restrooms at or near the airport'. The authority is also entitled in
        law to charge fees or rent from persons who are given by the
        authority any facility for carrying on any trade or business at any
        airport, heliport or airstrip'.

        2. The tender floated by AAI required the tenderer to quote
        royalty amount that the tenderer is offering to pay. The licence


ITA 73, 75, 77 to 82, 86, 100, 113, 123, 200, 561, 633 and 688 of 2005
                                                                         Page 5 of 15
        fee which is already fixed by AAI and is mentioned in the tender
        documents is in addition to the royalty. The successful bidder is
        one who quotes the highest fixed royalty.

        3. The licence fee is determined by AAI having regard to the area
        made available to the successful bidder and can be unilaterally
        revised by AAI, whereas the royalty is quoted by the bidder and
        accepted by AAI and is not open for revision.

        4. The royalty is payable 30 days after the area is handed over to
        the successful bidder while the payment of licence fee
        commences immediately on such handing over."

12. This Court has heard the submissions of Mr. Zoheb Hossain, learned
Senior Standing Counsel for the Revenue in the quantum appeals, Mr.
Asheesh Jain, learned Senior Standing Counsel in the penalty appeals
and Mr. Ajay Vohra, learned Senior Advocate for the Assessee.

13. The contention of the Revenue as regards question (i) in the
quantum appeals is that it stands covered in favour of the Revenue by
the judgement of this Court in Apeejay Surrendera Park Hotels Limited
v. Union of India (2016) 383 ITR 697 (Del) where, the Court
emphasized the expanded definition of the word `rent' under Section
194-I of the Act. It is submitted that in the present case when the LA is
read as a whole, it is plain that the payment made, although in two parts,
is for operating an executive lounge. The non-payment of even one
component, as either of royalty or of the fee for the space, would entail
the Assessee losing the right to operate the executive lounge. The
payment therefore, fell within the ambit of `rent' under Section 194 -I of
the Act.


14. As regards Question (ii) in the quantum appeals, Mr. Hossain


ITA 73, 75, 77 to 82, 86, 100, 113, 123, 200, 561, 633 and 688 of 2005
                                                                         Page 6 of 15
pointed out that the CIT (A) himself had remanded the matter to the AO
for the proper computation of the interest payable. Mr. Hossain placed
reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Coca Cola
Beverage (P) Limited v. Commissioner of Income Tax (2007) 8 SCC
463.

15. In reply, Mr. Ajay Vohra, learned Senior counsel for the Assessee
referred to the decision in Japan Airlines Co. Limited v. CIT (2013)
377 ITR 372 (SC) to draw a distinction between the payment of royalty
which was for the right to operate the executive lounge, and which
amount was quoted by the Assessee itself, and the amount paid to use
the space where lounge was operated which alone could be
characterized `rent'. It was submitted that the intention of the parties had
to be gathered from the LA which for that purpose had to be read as a
whole. In the present case, in the context in which there was a bidding
process preceding the grant of the licence in favour of the Assessee, the
fixed royalty payment was in fact spread over the period of licence and
therefore, it should be construed as payment of royalty in instalments.


16. Mr Vohra submitted that it was the payment for the use of space
alone which could be construed as `rent' for the purpose of Section 194 -
I of the Act. He submitted that the payment was for the grant of two
different rights. Even where both the rights were granted under the same
LA, the payments for each of them had to be treated as two distinct
payments. He referred to the certificate issued by the AAI to the effect
that both payments were distinct. Reliance was also placed on the
decisions in CIT v. NIIT Limited (2009) 318 ITR 289 (Del) and TRIL



ITA 73, 75, 77 to 82, 86, 100, 113, 123, 200, 561, 633 and 688 of 2005
                                                                         Page 7 of 15
Infopark Limited v. ITO (2016) 385 ITR 465 (Mad). In support of the
proposition that the payment of royalty is essentially a payment for the
`right to do business', reliance was placed on the decision in Shankar
Trading (P) Limited v. CIT 208 Taxman 526 (Del). In support of the
contention that a term used in the statute should be contextually
interpreted, reliance was placed by Mr. Vohra on the decision in CIT v.
DLF Commercial Developers Limited (2013) 261 CTR 127 (Del).

17. The relevant clauses in the LA have been extracted hereinabove.
Although a plain reading of Clause 2 of the LA might show that the
payment by the Assessee to the AI for the operation of the executive
lounge at IGI Airport is split into two distinct parts viz., , royalty and the
fees for the space, it is in effect a payment for the use of the lounge for
the purposes of operating it. If there is a default in payment either of the
components of the licence fee the inevitable consequence is that the
Assessee loses the right to operate the executive lounge. This position is
not even disputed by the Assessee.

18. Clause (i) (b) of the Explanation to Section 194 I of the Act states
that the word "rent" for the purposes of that provisions means "any
payment, by whatever name called, under any lease, sub-lease, tenancy
or any other agreement or arrangement for the use of (either separately
or together) any building". In Apeejay Surrendera Park Hotels Limited
v. Union of India (supra), while interpreting the word `rent' in Section
194-I of the Act, this Court summarized the legal position as under:
        "(i) The word `rent' in Section 194-I of the Act has to be
        interpreted widely and not confined to payments received towards
        a `lease, sub-lease or tenancy' or transactions of such like nature.



ITA 73, 75, 77 to 82, 86, 100, 113, 123, 200, 561, 633 and 688 of 2005
                                                                         Page 8 of 15
        (ii) given the context of the said provision which is intended to
        cover a wide range of transactions as is evident from the words
        "any other agreement or arrangement" it is evident that the
        principles of ejusdem generis or noscitur a sociis cannot be
        invoked to narrow the scope of those words. The words "any
        payment" occurring in definition of 'rent' in the Explanation to
        Section 194-I is also indicative of the legislative intent to accord
        the widest possible meaning to the payment received as a result of
        any of the underlying transactions envisaged in that provision.

        (iii) After the 46th amendment to the Constitution which inserted
        Article 366 (29A) the 'dominant purpose' test cannot form the sole
        basis for determining whether the payment received as
        consideration for the transfer of the right to use or enjoy a
        property is 'rent'. The context in which the word has been used,
        the particular statute in which it occurs and the legislative intent
        has to be taken into consideration in examining a narrower or a
        wider meaning has to be given to the word.

        (iv) Even where the room charges collected by a hotel from its
        customer is not confined to the use of the space but to a host of
        facilities and amenities such payment would still fall within the
        ambit of 'rent' under Section 194-I of the Act."

19.1 In Japan Airlines Co. Limited v. CIT (supra) the above position
was reiterated by the Supreme Court. There the question was whether
the charges collected by the AAI for landing and parking of aircraft and
other services and facilities offered in connection therewith could be
characterized as `rent' within the meaning of Section 194 -I of the Act.
In paras 14 and 15 of the said decision, the Court observed as under:
        "14. From the reading of this Section, it becomes clear that TDS
        is to be made on the 'rent'. The expression 'rent' is given much
        wider meaning under this provision than what is normally known
        in common parlance. In the first instance, it means any payment
        which is made under any lease, sub-lease, tenancy. Once the
        payment is made under lease, sub-lease or tenancy, the
        nomenclature which is given is inconsequential. Such payment


ITA 73, 75, 77 to 82, 86, 100, 113, 123, 200, 561, 633 and 688 of 2005
                                                                         Page 9 of 15
        under lease, sub-lease and/or tenancy would be treated as `rent'.
        In the second place, such a payment made even under any other
        'agreement or arrangement for the use of any land or any building'
        would also be treated as 'rent'. Whether or not such building is
        owned by the payee is not relevant. The expressions 'any
        payment', by whatever name called and 'any other agreement or
        arrangement' have the widest import. Likewise, payment made for
        the 'use of any land or any building' widens the scope of the
        proviso.
        15. In the present case, we find that these Airlines are allowed to
        land and take-off their Aircrafts at IGIA for which landing fee is
        charged. Likewise, they are allowed to park their Aircrafts at
        IGIA for which parking fee is charged. It is done under an
        agreement and/or arrangement with AAI. The moot question is as
        to whether landing and take-off facilities on the one hand and
        parking facility on the other hand, would mean to 'use of the
        land'."

19.2 Thereafter in para 18, the Supreme Court observed as under:

        "18. We are convinced that the charges which are fixed by the
        AAI for landing and take-off services as well as for parking of
        aircrafts are not for the 'use of the land'. That would be too
        simplistic an approach, ignoring other relevant details which
        would amply demonstrate that these charges are for services and
        facilities offered in connection with the aircraft operation at the
        airport. To point out at the outset, these services include providing
        of air traffic services, ground safety services, aeronautical
        communication facilities, installation and maintenance of
        navigational aids and meteorological services at the airport."

19.3. After discussing the various types of facilities that were offered for
the payment made, the Court in Japan Airlines Co. Limited v. CIT
(supra) held as under:
        "We have emphasised the technological aspects of these runways
        in some detail to highlight the precision with which designing and
        engineering goes into making these runways to be fool proof for
        safety purposes. The purpose is to show that the AAI is providing
        all these facilities for landing and take-off of an aircraft and in


ITA 73, 75, 77 to 82, 86, 100, 113, 123, 200, 561, 633 and 688 of 2005
                                                                         Page 10 of 15
        this whole process, 'use of the land' pails into insignificance. What
        is important is that the charges payable are for providing of these
        facilities."

19.4 It was in the above context that the Supreme Court in Japan
Airlines Co. Limited v. CIT (supra) reversed the decision of this Court
which had held in favour of the Revenue. At the same time, the Supreme
Court reiterated that the definition of `rent' under Section 194-I of the
Act had to be given the statute. In para 23 it is observed as under:
        "23. At this stage, we would like to make one comment about the
        judgment of the Madras High Court. Madras High Court has
        given one more reason in support of its view that the charges paid
        by the Airlines to the AAI do not come within the definition of
        the 'rent' as defined under Section 194-I. The High Court has held
        that the words 'any other agreement or arrangement for the use of
        any land or any building' have to be read ejusdem generis and it
        should take it colour from the earlier portion of the definition
        namely "lease, sub-lease and tenancy". Thereby, it has tried to
        limit the ambit of words 'any other agreement or arrangement'.
        This reasoning is clearly fallacious. A bare reading of the
        definition of 'rent' contained in explanation to Section 194-I
        would make it clear that in the first place, the payment, by
        whatever name called, under any lease, sub-lease, tenancy which
        is to be treated as 'rent'. That is rent in traditional sense. However,
        second part is independent of the first part which gives much
        wider scope to the term 'rent'. As per this whenever payment is
        made for use of any land or any building by any other agreement
        or arrangement, that is also to be treated as 'rent'. Once such a
        payment is made for use of land or building under any other
        agreement or arrangement, such agreement or arrangement gives
        the definition of rent of very wide connotation. To that extent,
        High Court of Delhi appears to be correct that the scope of
        definition of rent under this definition is very wide and not limited
        to what is understood as rent in common parlance. It is a different
        matter that the High Court of Delhi did not apply this definition
        correctly to the present case as it failed to notice that in substance
        the charges paid by these airlines are not for 'use of land' but for
        other facilities and services wherein use of the land was only







ITA 73, 75, 77 to 82, 86, 100, 113, 123, 200, 561, 633 and 688 of 2005
                                                                         Page 11 of 15
        minor and insignificant aspect. Thus it did not correctly
        appreciate the nature of charges that are paid by the airlines for
        landing and parking charges which is not, in substance, for use of
        land but for various other facilities extended by the AAI to the
        airlines. Use of land, in the process, become incidental. Once it is
        held that these charges are not covered by Section 194-I of the
        Act, it is not necessary to go into the scope of Section 194-C of
        the Act."

20. The upshot of the above observation is that in each case the
agreement in question has to be examined to ascertain if the payment is
predominantly for the use of space. In the present case, the Assessee is
permitted to operate an executive lounge. The question of being able to
operate the lounge without the actual use of the space simply does not
arise. The payment for the use of space is inseparable from the payment
of royalty for the right to operate the lounge. Therefore, even applying
the ratio of Japan Airlines Co. Limited v. CIT (supra) the only
conclusion that can be drawn is that the payment of the sum by the
Assessee to the AAI under the LA falls within the expanded definition
of `rent' under Section 194-I of the Act. The certificate issued by the
AAI stating that the payment of licence fee for the space is different
from the payment of royalty will not make a difference to the legal
position as regards Section 194 I of the Act.

21. The decisions in CIT v. NIIT Limited (supra) and TRIL Infopark
Limited v. ITO (supra) turned on their own facts. In TRIL Infopark
Limited (supra) the payment of Rs. 1412 crores by the lessee to the
lessor was determined in the competitive bidding that took place even
before the joint venture partner in whose favour the lease was to be
granted was incorporated. The said amount was to be paid as a lumpsum



ITA 73, 75, 77 to 82, 86, 100, 113, 123, 200, 561, 633 and 688 of 2005
                                                                         Page 12 of 15
to the lessor who in turn was required to make it over to the
Government. It was in those circumstances that the Madras High Court
held that "once it is understood to be a consideration paid to the
Government, the question of deducting tax at source does not arise."
The said decision is, therefore, of no of assistance to the Assessee in the
present case.


22. In CIT v. NIIT Limited (supra) the question that arose was whether
the Assessee was liable to deduct tax at source under Section 194-I of
the Act in respect of the payments made to the franchisee under the head
`Infrastructural claims'. It was held on fact that the relationship bet ween
the parties was not of a lessor and lessee. The limited purpose was to run
an education centre offering NIIT courses as specified in the franchisee
agreement. Although the charges were broken up under two heads, viz.,
as marketing claim and infrastructure claim, there was no payment of
`rent' by the Assessee to the franchisee within the meaning of Section
194-I of the Act. This decision is , therefore, also not helpful to the
Assessee here.

23. The Court is satisfied that in the present case, the payment made by
the Assessee to AAI under the LA is `rent' within the meaning of
Section 194-I of the Act. Question (i) in the quantum appeals is,
therefore, answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and
against the Assessee.

24. Turning to the question (ii) both the parties have placed reliance on
the decision of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Coca Cola Beverage
(P) Limited v. Commissioner of Income Tax (supra). The Supreme


ITA 73, 75, 77 to 82, 86, 100, 113, 123, 200, 561, 633 and 688 of 2005
                                                                         Page 13 of 15
Court in that case referred to Circular dated 29 th January 1997 issued by
the CBDT which declared as under:
        "no demand visualised under Section 102 (1) of the Income Tax
        Act should be enforced after the tax deductor has satisfied the
        officer-in-charge of TDS, that taxes due have been paid by the
        deductee assessee. However, this will not alter the liability to
        charge interest under Section 201 (1-A) of the Act till the date of
        payment of taxes by the deductee assessee or the liability for
        penalty under Section 271-C of the Income Tax Act."

25. The matter stands already remanded to the AO to apply the
aforementioned circular and give appeal effect accordingly. Question
(ii) is answered by directing the AO to compute the interest liability in
terms of Section 210 (1A) of the Act in terms of the decision in
Hindustan Coca Cola Beverage (P) Limited v. Commissioner of
Income Tax (supra) and the aforementioned circular dated 29th January
1997 and work out the appeal effect accordingly.

26. Turning now to the penalty appeals, there is merit in the contention
of the Assessee that the question whether in the present case the
payment of royalty for the right to operate the executive lounge is in fact
`rent' under Section 194-I of the Act, was a debateable issue. The fact
that the LA termed this payment as 'royalty' may have given rise to a
reasonable doubt whether it should nevertheless to be treated as 'rent'.
The Court is of the view that in the circumstances, the Assessee can take
advantage of the exemption provided under Section 273 B of the Act by
contending that there were bonafide reasonable grounds for the Assessee
not to have deducted tax at source from the payment made to AAI under
the LA. This was not a case where the Assessee could be said to have
deliberately avoided making payment of tax so as to attract penalty


ITA 73, 75, 77 to 82, 86, 100, 113, 123, 200, 561, 633 and 688 of 2005
                                                                         Page 14 of 15
under Section 271 C of the Act. The Court is unable to find any error
having been committed by the ITAT in answering the said issue in
favour of the Assessee.


27. Accordingly, the sole question framed by this Court in the penalty
appeals is answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the Assessee and
against the Revenue.


28. The appeals are accordingly disposed of.




                                                                    S. MURALIDHAR, J



                                                             PRATHIBA M. SINGH, J
JULY 04, 2017
b'nesh/Rm




ITA 73, 75, 77 to 82, 86, 100, 113, 123, 200, 561, 633 and 688 of 2005
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