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Chandigarh Housing Board Sector 9, Chandigarh Vs. A.C.I.T. C-1(1) Chandigarh
April, 03rd 2014
               IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL
                 CHANDIG ARH BENCH ` A', CHANDIG ARH

       BEFORE SHRI T.R. SOOD, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND
           Ms. SUSHMA CHOWLA, JUDICI AL MEMBER

                 ITAs No. 1109, 1110, 1111, 1112,
                1113, 1114, 1115 & 1116/Chd/2013
       Assessment Years : 2006-07, 2007-08, 2008-09, 2009-10,
                 2006-07, 2007-08, 2008-09, 2009-10


Chandigarh Housing Board                         Vs.             A.C.I.T. C-1(1)
Sector 9, Chandigarh                                             Chandigarh
AAALC 0132H
(Appellant)                                              (Respondent)


Appellant by: S/Shri Ravi Shankar, B.M. Monga & Rohit Kaura
              Respondent by:       Smt. Jyoti Kumari


                      Date of hearing                             5.3.2014
              Date of Pronouncement                               27.3.2014

                                         O R D E R

PER BENCH

I T As N o . 1 1 0 9 , 1 1 1 0 , 1 1 1 1 & 1 1 1 2 / C h d / 2 0 1 3

        All these appeals have been disposed of by the Ld. CIT(A)

by a common order dated 30.9.2013, therefore these appeals

were heard together and are being disposed off by this common

order.


2.      In all these appeals the assessee has raised the following

grounds:

        "1     That the Ld. CIT(A) has erred in lower authorities as well as
        on facts of the case in upholding the action of the Assessing
        officer in passing the order u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 147.

        2     That the Ld. CIT(A) is not justified in upholding the order of
        the Assessing officer because there was no new/fresh material that
        had come to the possession of the Assessing officer addition it
        was only a case of `change of opinion' and not per se `reasons to
        believe.'

        3     That the Ld. CIT(A) is not justified in concluding that the
        appellant had deliberately stopped paying surcharge w.e.f.
        Assessment year    2006-07 though it had paid the same upto
                                          2

      Assessment year 2005-06 ignoring that no surcharge is payable
      after Assessment year 2005-06 as per rates in force.

      4     That the Ld. CIT(A) is not justified in upholding the order of
      the Assessing officer because for assuming jurisdiction for
      reopening u/s 147 after four years there has to be a specific
      allegation in the reasons recorded that there was any default on
      the part of the assessee in not making `true and full disclosure'
      which is `sine qua non".

      5     That the Ld. CIT(A) is not justified in upholding the re-
      assessment order of the Assessing officer as the re assessment
      order had again been made in the same status, re-assessing the
      same income which tantamount to review not permissible under
      law."

3     By the consent of the parties, the facts for Assessment

year 2006-07 in ITA No. 1109/Chd/2013 has been taken for

detailed adjudication. Brief facts for Assessment year                    2006-07

are that the assessee filed return of income at Rs. 290425186/.

Income     was assessed        u/s 143(3)         by an      assessment        order

passed on 22.12.2008.           Thereafter assessment was reopened

after recording the reasons and notice u/s 148 was served on

the assessee on 30.3.2012.                The main reason recorded for

reopening of the assessment was that the assessee claimed to

be a local authority and therefore not paid surcharge on the

tax whereas the assessee was actually not a local authority.

The assessee raised objections in respect of                  reopening of the

assessment and it was mainly submitted that all the facts and

information were provided during assessment proceedings and

therefore it cannot be said that income of the assessee has

escaped leading to the issuance of notice u/s 148.                         It was

pointed out that the assessee i.e. Chandigarh Housing Board

(CHB) was constituted by Govt of India, Ministry of Home

Affairs vide Notification dated 14.1.1975 in exercise of powers

conferred by S 87 of Punjab Reorganization Act, 1966 as

extended UT of Chandigarh, Haryana Housing Board Act, 1971

as   in   force   in   the   State   of       Haryana   at   the   date   of    this
                                               3


notification.        As per clause 3(3) of the Act, the Chandigarh

Housing Board stand established and constituted as "local

authority". Copy of Haryana Housing Board Act, 1971 was also

furnished. The purpose of the Act referred to in sub section (3)

included       the   management          and        use    of   lands     and     buildings

belonging to are vesting in the board under or for the purpose

of this Act, and the exercise of its rights over and with respect

to such lands and buildings for the purposes of this Act.

Therefore it was clear that from the date of inception CHB was

a local authority.            The Board has been filing returns in the

status of local authority, it was accepted in the earlier years. It

was   further        pointed     out    that       the     assessee      being     a    local

authority was exempt from income tax u/s 10(20A) of Income -

tax Act, 1961.         This exemption was withdrawn w.e.f. 1.4.2003

and the income of the Board became taxable and the Board

started paying income tax and filing return of income under the

status of local authority.             Removal of exemption does not mean

that that status of assessee is also changed.                            It was pointed

out that whole of the capital was owned by the Chandigarh

Administration and no contribution has been made by any

private    party.      Therefore         in        these     circumstances         it    was

requested that no such surcharge can be levied.                                    Further

replies    were        also    submitted            giving      the     details    of     the

management           and   the    meaning           of    the   local    authority.       The

Assessing officer after considering the reply referred to the

provisions of section            10(20) and observed that after 1.4.2003

the assessee-Board             did not fall under the                   status of       local

authority. The Assessing officer observed that the assessee

has   itself    admitted       that     after      removal      of    exemption         w.e.f.
                                                4


1.4.2003      the     income       of    the    Board        became         taxable.          The

Assessing       officer also        referred          to    the    decision       of    Hon'ble

Supreme Court in case of Union of India Vs. R.C. Jain & Ors,

AIR    1981      (S.C)       951        which       laid     down     various          test    for

determining where a particular entity was local authority or

not?    After discussing each of the test he discussed the facts

of the assessee and observed that the assessee cannot be

called a local authority.

4      The      Assessing      officer         also    observed           that    it   was     not

correct that all the information was provided by the assessee

during assessment proceedings. According to him the assessee

was aware that it is not a local authority and it was an entity

which was liable to tax but despite that the fact the assessee

has    not   paid     surcharge          on     the    amount        of    tax.        He     also

discussed       the    explanatory            notes        which    clearly       shows       how

various authorities were not to be treated as local authority.

He also observed that even if the assessee is a local authority

under some other provisions the same will have no bearing on

the    status    of   the    assessee           under       Income        -tax    Act,      1961.

Ultimately      he held that the assessee was not a local authority

and levied surcharge on the income of the assessee.

5      Before the Ld. CIT(A) the submissions made before the

Assessing officer were reiterated and it was submitted that

assessment          cannot    be    reopened           merely on           the     change       of

opinion.     In this regard reliance was placed on the decision of

Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of CIT Vs. Kelvinator of India

Ltd. 320 ITR 561 and in case of Parixit industries P. Ltd. 352

ITR 349.
                                       5





6      The    Ld.    CIT(A)    after       considering        the    submissions
observed that assessment in all the four years were reopened
because surcharge was not levied in the original assessment
completed u/s 143(3). The objection                was found not to be
sustainable because of Exp (2)(c)(ii) to Sec 147 of the Act
which provides that if income has been assessed on too low a
rate   then    the   same     shall    be    deemed      to    be    a   case   of
concealment of income.          He also noted that the assessee had
paid surcharge in Assessment year 2005-06 on the declared
income and stopped paying surcharge w.e.f. 2006-07 onwards.
Therefore it can be safely concluded that the assessee has
deliberately    stopped     paying     surcharge.     In      this   background
reopening was held to be valid.             The decision relied on by the
assessee was found to be distinguishable.                In respect of status
the Ld. CIT(A) made following observations vide para 6.3 and
6.4 at page 5 & 6 of his order:
       "6.3 Coming to the issue of status in which the appellant is to be
       assessed, I may mention that clause (20A) of Sec 10, dealing with
       the exemption of income of an `auth ority' constituted for the
       purpose of housing accommodation           etc. has been omitted by
       Finance Act, 2002 with effect from 1.4.2003 and so the income of
       the appellant is not exempt as such. The other clause pertaining
       to the provisions of taxability of income of local authority is clause
       (20) of sec 10 and the case of the appellant is not covered by this
       clause also, after the insertion of Exp below this clause, by which
       the types of assesses covered under the expression `local
       authority' has been enumerated.        Thus the appellant cannot be
       treated as local authority for the purposes of Income Tax Ac, 1961.
       The appellant has submitted that as per Haryana Housing Board
       Act, 1971; the appellant was established and constituted as local
       authority, but this argument and other arguments in this regard do
       not hold water because the appellant board might be treated as
       local authority under any other law / Act, but it is out of the
       purview of the definition of local authority as per the provisions of
       Income -tax Act, 1961.       The status of the appellant is not of a
       local authority under the Income -tax Act, 1961 and since the
       status of the appellant board cannot be individual or firm or
       company or AOP or body of Individuals, it has to be assessed as
       "artificial juridical person'. In fact the status of the appellant has
       also been changed by passing order u/s 154 of the Act to `artificial
       juridical person' in respect of all thee years vide      orders dated
       14.8.2013 u/s 154 of the Act.        The appellant has filed appeals
       against thee orders us/ 154 also.         As the appellant is to be
       assessed in the status of `artificial juridical person', it is liable to
       pay income tax as well as surcharge.

       6.4   The appellant has relied upo0nteh decisions of Hon'ble
       ITAT, Chandigarh in its own case of Assessment year          2006-07
       (supra) to support its argument that it is a local authority but this
       argument of the appellant does not hold water since ITAT has
                                         6

       merely reproduced the facts, as submitted by the appellant itself.
       The Tribunal has mentioned in para 2.1 of its order as under:


               "2.1 The facts of the case, in brief are that the appellant,,
               Chandigarh Housing Board is a local authority constituted
               and established."

7      Before us the Ld. Counsel for the assessee with reference

to various grounds made detailed submissions which can be

summarized as under:

(a)    Original      assessment         was       completed      u/s    143(3)   on

22.12.2008 and notice u/s 148 has been issued after a gap of

four   years.        All   the   material        facts   were   disclosed    during

assessment proceedings and no new material has come to the

knowledge of the Assessing officer therefore it is a simple case

of    change    of    opinion    which      is    not    permissible    under    law

particularly      in view of the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court

in case of CIT Vs. Kelvinator of India Ltd. (supra)?. He also

relied on the decision of Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in case of

Parixit industries P. Ltd. (supra. The Assessing officer has not

made any specific allegation that the assessee has failed to

give true and full disclosure of relevant material.                          In the

absence of such failure the assessment could not be reopened

and in this regard he relied on the decision of Hon'ble Punjab

and Haryana High Court              in case of Duli Chand SinghaniaV

ACIT, 269 ITR 192 (PH).

(b)    He   contended that         it   is not true on the             part of   the

Assessing officer to hold that the assessee has stopped paying

surcharge deliberately after Assessment year 2005-06.                        In this

regard he referred to paper book page 17 to 22 which contains

a schedule f or rates of tax for various years and pointed out

that surcharge was payable only by Assessment year                          2005-06
                                       7


and no surcharge was payable from Assessment year 2006-07

as per this schedule.

(c)    He contended that       the assessment           has been made u/s

147 r.w.s.143(3) again in the status of local authority which

becomes clear from Col 5 dealing with the status at page 1 of

assessment order.          This fact clearly shows that assessment

has been reopened without any reason particularly when the

assessee has been assessed under the same status.

(d)    He reiterated the submissions made before the Assessing

officer that the assessee still remains local authority.                   The

assessee was constituted under the provisions of Haryana

Housing Board, 1971by the Govt of India and clause 3.3 of this

said   Act   clearly show     that    CHB    was   established       as   local

authority.     Therefore status of the assessee remains local

authority and even if the assessee is no more exempt from tax

u/s 10(20) that does not mean that the status of the assessee

also stands changed.



8      On    the   other   hand,     the   Ld.   D.R.    for   the   Revenue

submitted that the assessee Board was exempt from income tax

as per Sec 10(20).         The exemption was removed by the Govt

w.e.f. 1.4.2003.      The assessee started filing returns and was

paying taxes but from Assessment year 2006-07 the assessee

stopped paying surcharge. During assessment proceedings the

fact that the assessee has specifically claimed the status of

local authority and no surcharge was payable, was not brought

to the attention of the Assessing officer.          Therefore it is not a

case of proper disclosure and assessment has been rightly

reopened.     She pointed out that in the original assessment u/s
                                             8


143(3) nothing was discussed regarding status of the assessee

and therefore it cannot be said that any opinion was formed.

Once no opinion has been formed in the original assessment

then it cannot be called to be a case of change of opinion. In

this regard she relied on the decision of Full Bench of Delhi

High Court in case of CIT Vs. Usha International Ltd. 348 ITR

485.     In this case it was clearly observed that reference to the

decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Kalyanji Mavji &

Co. Vs. CIT, 102 ITR 287 that if no opinion is formed in the

original assessment then it cannot be said later on when the

assessment is reopened that it is a case of change of opinion.

She      also   submitted     that      in       the   original    assessment      the

Assessing officer has taken a view on the wrong appreciation

then later on it cannot be said that assessment has been

reopened on the change of opinion and in this regard relied on

the decision of Som Dutt Builders P Ltd. Vs. DCIT, 98 ITD 78.

She contended that it is a settled position that if the assessee

fails    to   disclose   fully    and        truly     material    facts   then   such

assessment can be reopened and in this regard relied on the

decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Phool Chand

Bajrang Lal and Anr Vs. ITO, 203 ITR 456.                         She also relied on

the decision of Gujarat High Court in case of Praful Chunilal

Patel Vs. ACIT, 236 ITR 832.                       She submitted that Hon'ble

Punjab and Haryana High Court                      in case of Jawand Sons Vs.

CIT, 326 ITR 39 has held that after the amendment to Sec 147

w.e.f. 1.4.1989 wide powers have been given to the Assessing

officer and in a case where even the assessee has disclosed

all     the   material   facts,   even        then      the   assessment     can    be

reopened.       She submitted that assessment has been reopened
                                         9


after four years only in Assessment year 2006-07 and in other

years, reopening has been done within four years.

9       The Ld. D.R. for the Revenue submitted that there is no

force in the contention           of the Ld. Counsel for the assessee

that fresh assessment u/s 147 r.w.s. 143(3) has been made in

the same status.         No doubt in Col 5 status of the assessee has

been     shown     as    local   authority   but   this   is   clear   case   of

typographical mistake because body of the assessment order

clearly shows that the Assessing officer has clearly held that

the assessee is not local authority.

10      She also submitted that the assessee may be a local

authority for the purpose of Haryana Housing Board Act but the

assessee cannot be treated as local authority for the purpose

of Income Tax Act particular after the removal of exemption u/s

10(20).      She also referred to the detail discussion in the

assessment order and relied on the assessment order.

11      W e have gone through the rival submissions carefully.

Sec 147 reads as under:

        "147 -       If the Assessing officer has reason to believe that any
        income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any
        Assessment year he may subject to the provisions of section 148
        to 153, assess or reassess such income and also any other income
        chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment and which comes
        to his notice subsequently in the course of the proceedings under
        this section or recomputed the loss or the depreciation allowance
        or any other allowance, as the case may be for the Assessment
        year concerned (hereafter in this section and in section 148 to
        153 referred to as the relevant Assessment year ):

        Provided that where an assessment under sub-section (3) of
        section 143 or this section has been made for the relevant
        Assessment year no action shall be taken under this section after
        the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant Assessment
        year     unless any income chargeable to tax has escaped
        assessment for such Assessment year by reason of the failure on
        the part of the assessee to make a return u/s 139 or in response to
        a notice issued under sub-sec (1) of section 142 or sec 148 or to
        disclose fully and truly material facts necessary for his
        assessment, for that Assessment year ."

Plain    reading    of    the    above   provision   shows      that   what   is

required for reopening the assessment is that the Assessing
                                    10


officer should have some reasons to believe that the income

has escaped assessment.          In this regard it is important to note

that clause (c)(ii) of Exp 2 further provides that such income

would be deemed to have been escaped income if the income

has been charged at too low a rate.              In the case before us

since surcharge was not levied in the original assessment

therefore it is a case of income being assessed at too low a

rate. Now the question is whether in this case assessment has

been reopened on the basis of change of opinion or not?                    No

doubt Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of CIT Vs. Kelvinator of

India Ltd (supra) has clearly observed as under:

     "The concept of `change of opinion' on the part of th Assessing
     officer to reopen an assessment does not stand obliterated after
     the substitution of section 147 of Income -tax Act, 1961 by the
     Director Tax Laws (Amendment) Acts, 1987 and 1989. After the
     amendment, the Assessing officer has to have reason to believe
     that income has escaped assessment, but this does not imply that
     the Assessing officer can reopen an assessment on mere change
     of opinion. The concept of `change of opinion' must be treated as
     an in-built test to check the abuse of power. Hence after April 1,
     1989 the Assessing officer has power to reopen an assessment
     provided there is `tangible material' to come to the conclusion that
     there was escapement of income from assessment. Reason must
     have a link with the formation of the belief."

The above observation is subject to limitation i.e. if no opinion

has been formed then it cannot be said that assessment has

been reopened on the basis of change of opinion.                       In this

regard   Hon'ble   Delhi    High    Court   in    case    CIT    Vs.    Usha

International   Ltd.   (supra)   considered      this   aspect   in    detail.

After considering the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in

case of CIT Vs. Kelvinator of India Ltd (supra) it was observed

at para 9 as under:

     "It was argued on behalf of the Revenue that for        determining
     whether or not it is not a case of change of opinion, reference can
     and should be made only to the assessment order and the
     discussion or the reasons     stated therein. Reliance was palced
     on the decision of this court in CIT Vs. HP Sharma (1980) 122 ITR
     675 (Delhi) and Consolidated Photo and Finvest Ltd. Vs. ACIT
                                     11

      (2006) 281 ITR 394 (Delhi). The relevant portion of the judgment
      in HP Sharma (supra) reads as under (page 698):

             "Adverting to the next question as to whether the resorts to
             reassessment u/s 147(b) and 148 of the Act were justified or
             not, it is noteworthy that both the Income Tax officer and the
             Appellate Assistant Commissioner have clearly observed that
             the assessee had not disclosed at the original assessment
             stage that the rents realized exceeded those mentioned in
             the municipal records.     The Tribunal has not controverted
             this finding, perhaps it did not consider it appropriate to into
             the same after having held that the municipal valuation
             should have a sway over the rent realized. My ld. Brother
             has on this score sent the matter back to the Tribunal for
             giving a finding on this aspect. I will only like to observe in
             this connection that the second Explanation to sec 147 itself
             makes it clear that the production before the ITO of account
             books or other evidence from which material evidence could
             with due diligence have been discovered by the ITO will not
             necessarily amount to disclosure within the meaning of this
             section. The Hon'ble Supreme Court too has, in the decision
             of Kalyanji Mavji and Co. Vs. CIT (1976) 102 ITR 287 (S.C)
             and CIT Vs. A. Raman and Co. (1968)67 ITR 11 (S.C)
             observed that information in order to justify reassessment
             may be obtained even from the record of original assessment
             from an investigation of the material on record or the facts
             disclosed thereby or from other enquiry or research into
             facts or law. "To inform" means to "to impart knowledge"
             and the detail available to the ITO in the papers filed before
             him does not by its mere availability become an item of
             information. It is transmuted into an item of information in
             his possession only if, and only when, its existence is
             realized and its implications are recognized. Where the ITO
             had not in the original assessment proceedings applied his
             mind, the reassessment proceedings are valid (see in this
             respect the decision of the Kerala and Madras High Courts
             in United Mercantile Co. Ltd. Vs. CIT (1967) 64 ITR 218
             (Ker) and Muthukrishna Reddiar Vs. CIT (1973) 90 ITR 503
             (Ker) and A.L.A Firm Vs. CIT (1976) 102 ITR 622 (Mad).

      It need hardly be said that change of opinion presupposes that
      there was earlier a formation of an opinion. When no such opinion
      was formed, it will be too far fetched to assume that a change in
      that opinion was being effected. Further, the safest and surest
      guide for ascertaining whether any such opinion was formed at the
      original assessment stage, is to look to the assessment order
      itself. When it, of its own, does not reveal that the matters and
      controversies now sought to be raised by way of reassessment
      were at all before the ITO or considered by him, it would be
      entirely surmiseful and therefore not permissible to still import
      their existence and consideration .       This can, however,   be
      permissible only where the assessment record of that stage
      overwhelmingly brings out that the mater did come for due
      consideration   and was in fact considered.     Mere silence on a
      matter or absence of discussion in the original order does not
      imply that the ITO adjudicated upon the same one way or the
      other." (emphasis supplied).

In the case before us admittedly no opinion was formed earlier

whether the assessee was a local authority or not? Further the

Ld. Counsel for the assessee has not placed any material

before us to show that the fact that the assessee was treated

as   local   authority,   was   brought     to   the   knowledge     of   the
                                       12


Assessing officer during original assessment proceedings u/s

143(3). Therefore there is clear failure on the part of the

assessee to disclose material fact that the assessee was being

treated as local authority. This aspect need to be examined

particularly in the background of removal of exemption u/s

10(20A) which at the relevant time i.e. year 2002 reads as

under:

      "Sec 10(20) -      the income of a local authority which is
      chargeable under the head "income from house property" "capital
      gains" or "income from other sources" or from a trade or business
      carried on but it which accrues or arises from the supply of a
      commodity or service (not being water or electricity_ within its own
      jurisdictional area or from the supply of water or electricity within
      or outside its own jurisdictional area"


      10(20A)     -      any income of an authority constituted in India
      by or under any law enacted either for the purpose of dealing with
      and satisfying the need for housing accommodation       or for the
      purpose of planning, development or improvement of cities, towns
      and villages, or for both."

Later on w.e.f. 1.4.2003 Sec 10(20A) was omitted by Finance

Act   2002       w.e.f.   1.4.2003    and     following   explanation        was

inserted in Sec 10(20):

      "The following Explanation shall be inserted to clause (20) of
      section 10 by the Finance Act, 2002 w.e.f. 1.4.2003:

      Explanation ­ For the purposes of this clause, the expression
      `local authority' means ­

      (i)         Panchayat as referred to in clause (d) of article 243 of
                  the Constitution; or

      (ii)        Municipality as referred to in clause (e) of article 243P of
                  the Constitution; or

      (iii)       Municipal Committee and District Board,

      Legally entitled to or entrusted by the Government with the control
      or management of a Municipal or local fund, or

      (iv)        Cantonment Board as defined in          section   3   of   the
                  Cantonments Act, 1924 (2 of 1924)."

Above        clearly   show   that   till   Assessment     year     2002-03

exemption was specifically granted to the local authority as per

the provisions of section            10(20A) which was omitted from

Assessment         year    2003-04      and   whatever    exemption      were
                                      13


required were made in terms of Sec 10(20). However,                    the

exemption was restricted by adding the explanation by which

the meaning of the local authority itself, was restricted.            This

amended position came up for interpretation before the Hon'ble

Supreme    Court    in   case    of        Agricultural   Produce   Market

Committee, Narela Vs. CIT, 305 ITR 1 and it was clearly

observed that definition given in Explanation to Sec 10(20) was

exhaustive and there was no scope for extending the meaning

of other authorities. Held column reads as under:

     "Held, that the appellant an agricultural marketing committee
     established under the Delhi Agricultural Produce Marketing
     (Regulation) Act, 1998 to provide facilities for marketing
     agricultural produce in Narela in Delhi and for performing other
     functions and duties such as superintendence, direction and
     control of markets for regulating the marketing of agricultural
     produce was not a "local authority" u/s 10(20) of the Income -tax
     Act, 1961 as amended by the Finance Act, 2002 and was therefore
     not exempt from income-tax thereunder.

     Since the works "other authority" were omitted from the scope of
     the expression "local authority" found in section 3(31) of the
     General clauses Act, 1897 in the Explanation to section 10(20) by
     the Finance Act, 2002 it would not be correct to say that the entire
     definition of the works "local authority" was bodily lifted from
     section 3(31) of the 1897 Act and incorporated by Parliament in
     the Explantion to s ection 10(20) of the Income -tax Act, 1961.
     The Explanation to section 10(20) provides a definition to the
     expression "local authority" and that is an exhaustive definition. It
     is not an inclusive definition. Therefore the functional test and
     test of incorporations as laid down in the case of R.C. Jain (1981)
     2 SCC 308, is no more applicable to section 10(20) as amended by
     the Finance Act, 2002.

     Union of India Vs. R.C. Jain 91981) 2 SCC 308 considered.

     The reference to "Municipal Committee" and "District Board" in the
     definition of "other authority" is out of abundant caution. In 1897
     when the General Clauses Act was enacted there existed in India
     Municipal Committees and District Boards. Therefore apart from a
     panchayat and a Municipality, Parliament in its wisdom decided to
     give exemption to Municipal Committees and District Boards and
     has advisedly retained their exemption. Articles 243F and 243ZF
     of the Constitution of India indicate that there could be enactments
     which still retain the entities like Municipal Committees and
     District Boards and if they exist, Parliament intends to give
     exemption to their income u/s 10(20)."

In view of this situation the assessee should have brought this

fact that it was treating itself as local authority and surcharge

was not payable specifically to the attention of the Assessing

officer. Having failed to do so it cannot be later on said that
                                       14


assessment has been wrongly opened. In fact in this regard we

are reminded of the famous lines of Hon'ble Supreme Court in

case of Phool Chand Bajrang Lal and Anr Vs. ITO (supra) relied

on by the D.R. for the Revenue which reads as under:

        "203 ITR 478 -     One of the purposes of section 147 appears to
        us to be to ensure that a party cannot get away by willfully making
        a false or untrue statement at the time of original assessment and
        when that falsity comes to notice to turn around and say `you
        accepted my lie, now your hand are tied and you can do nothing".
        It would be a travesty of justice to allow the assessee that
        latitude."

12      The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Honda Siel Power

Productions Ltd. Vs. DCIT & Another, 340 ITR 53                     has clearly

held if there is a failure on part of the assessee to disclosed

fully   and   truly   the   material    facts     of   the   case    then    such

reopening would be valid.

13      The Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in case of

Jawand Sons Vs. CIT (supra) further held that even if the

assessee has fully disclosed material facts and still if the

Assessing      officer   has   reason       to   believe     that   income    has

escaped the assessment then such reopening would be valid.

In this regard we reproduce the relevant observations of the

Court which are as under:

        "326 ITR 39 -      U/s 147 of the Income -tax Act, 1961 after its
        amendment w.e.f. April 1, 1989 wide power has been given to the
        Assessing officer even to cover cases where the assessee had
        fully disclosed the material facts. The only condition for action is
        that the Assessing officer should have reason to believe that the
        income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. Such belief
        can be reached in any manner."

Recently this issue also came up for consideration of the

Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in case of Arun Kumar

Goyal V CIT, ITA No. 54 of 2012 (order dated 21.11.2012).                      in

this case it was contended that the decision of Rajesh Jhavery

(supra) has already been distinguished by the Hon'ble Punjab &

Haryana High Court in case of CIT V. Paramjit Kaur, 311 ITR
                                        15


38 (PH).       Hon'ble High Court considered the provisions of

section 147 and observed at paras 12 to 14 as under:


      "12    There is, however, a sea-change after the amendment in
      Section 147 for determining jurisdictional scope for re-assessment
      of the escaped income.      The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajesh
      Jhaveri's case (supra) has explained and laid down that under the
      substituted Section 147 "existence of only the first condition
      suffices.  In other words if the Assessing Officer for whatever
      reason has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment
      it confers jurisdiction to reopen the assessment". It was further
      held that "so long as the ingredients of Section 147 are fulfilled,
      the Assessing Officer is free to initiate proceedings u/s 147 and
      failure to take steps u/s 143(3) will not render the Assessing
      Officer powerless to initiate re-assessment proceedings even when
      intimation u/s 143(1) had been issued.".

      13     The   expression "reason to        believe" thus cannot   be
      restrictively construed to say as if the Assessing Officer is
      obligated firstly to finally ascertain the factum of escaped income
      on the basis of admissible evidence and then only to issue shown
      cause to the assessee. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the
      final outcome of the proceedings initiated u/s 147 is not relevant
      and what is of relevance is the existence of reasons to make the
      Assessing Officer believe that there has been under-assessment of
      the assessee's income for a particular year.

      14     It is explicit from the post-amendment decisions cited above
      that once there are reasons for the Assessing Officer to believe,
      whether such reasons originate out of the record already
      scrutinized for otherwise, he shall be within his competence to
      initiate the re-assessment proceedings. The formation of belief by
      the Assessing Officer must always be tentative and not a firm or
      final conclusion as the latter will negate the very object of giving
      an opportunity of hearing to the assessee as       it will amount to
      post-decisional hearing."



      From the above it emerges that only requirement for

reopening the assessment is that there should be a reason to

believe that income has escaped assessment and such reasons

should be prima facie reason.


In view of the above discussion we are of the opinion that

assessment has been rightly reopened and therefore we reject

the   ground    of    he    assessee     relating   to   reopening   of   the

assessment.

14    We   find      no    force   in   the   contention   that   ultimately

assessment has been framed in the status of local authority.

No doubt in Col 5 which refers to status on the first page of the
                                    16


assessment order shows the status of the assessee was shown

as "local authority" but this seems to be a clear case of

typographical mistake. This becomes clear from the fact that

the   assessment     has   been    reopened     for   holding   that   the

assessee is not a local authority.          Detailed discussions have

been made at para 6 to 10 wherein it has been very clearly

observed that the assessee is not a local authority.            Therefore

merely mentioning the status of the assessee as local authority

on the first page would not alter the things. This situation

further becomes clear from the facts that the Assessing officer

has already passed the rectification order u/s 154 where this

mistake has been removed and the status of the assessee has

been rectified of "Artificial Juridical Person".

15    Last question to be decided is whether the assessee is

local authority or not?      The issue regarding meaning of local

authority came up for consideration           before the Hon'ble Apex

Court in case of Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Narela

Vs. CIT (supra).    In that case the assessee was an agricultural

marketing    committee     and    the    question   arose   whether    this

committee was a local authority or not? It was held as under:

       "305 ITR 1 -     Held,  that   the   appellant   an   agricultural
      marketing committee established under the Delhi Agricultural
      Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1998 to provide facilities for
      marketing agricultural produce in Narela in Delhi and for
      performing other functions and duties such as superintendence,
      direction and control of markets for regulating the marketing of
      agricultural produce was not a "local authority" u/s 10(20) of the
      Income -tax Act, 1961 as amended by the Finance Act, 2002 and
      was therefore not exempt from income-tax thereunder.

      Since the works "other authority" were omitted from the scope of
      the expression "local authority" found in section 3(31) of the
      General clauses Act, 1897 in the Explanation to section 10(20) by
      the Finance Act, 2002 it would not be correct to say that the entire
      definition of the works "local authority" was bodily lifted from
      section 3(31) of the 1897 Act and incorporated by Parliament in
      the Explantion to s ection 10(20) of the Income -tax Act, 1961.
      The Explanation to section 10(20) provides a definition to the
      expression "local authority" and that is an exhaustive definition. It
      is not an inclusive definition. Therefore the functional test and
                                    17

       test of incorporations as laid down in the case of R.C. Jain (1981)
       2 SCC 308, is no more applicable to section 10(20) as amended by
       the Finance Act, 2002.

       Union of India Vs. R.C. Jain 91981) 2 SCC 308 considered.

       The reference to "Municipal Committee" and "District Board" in the
       definition of "other authority" is out of abundant caution. In 1897
       when the General Clauses Act was enacted there existed in India
       Municipal Committees and District Boards. Therefore apart from a
       panchayat and a Municipality, Parliament in its wisdom decided to
       give exemption to Municipal Committees and District Boards and
       has advisedly retained their exemption. Articles 243F and 243ZF
       of the Constitution of India indicate that there could be enactments
       which still retain the entities like Municipal Committees and
       District Boards and if they exist, Parliament intends to give
       exemption to their income u/s 10(20)."






In this case it was observed at para 31 as under:

       "Before   concluding we quote hereinbelow an        important
       principle of law enunciated by this court in the case of R.C.
       Jain which reads as under:

       "........it is not a sound rule of interpretation to seek the
       meaning of words used in an Act, in the def clause of other
       statutes."

From    above    it   becomes    clear   that   for   understanding    the

meaning of expression "local authority" we do not have to refer

to the definition given in other statutes. Local authority has

been defined in Explanation to Sec 10(20) and the Court in the

above case has clearly held that this definition is of exhaustive

nature and cannot be extended to other organizations.

16     Even if assuming for argument sake that the definition of

local authority in Explanation to Sec 10(20) cannot be extended

to Sec 2(31) then also the assessee-Board does not fit into the

definition of local authority as interpreted by Hon'ble Supreme

Court in case of Union of India Vs. R.C. Jain & ors, (1981) 2

SCC 308 which has been relied on by the Assessing officer. In

this case the Court was required to consider whether Delhi

Development Authority was "local authority" for the purpose of

payment of Bonus Act, 1965.         The Court looked at Sec 3(31) of
                                                  18


the General Clauses Act, 1987 and observed at para 2 as

under:

     "Let us, therefore concentrate and confine our attention and
     enquiry to the definition of "local authority" in sec 3(31) of the
     General Clauses Act.         A proper and careful scrutiny of the
     language of section 3(31) suggests that an authority, in order to
     be a local authority, must be of like nature and character as a
     Municipal committee, District Board or Body of Port Commissioner,
     possessing, therefore many if not all of the distinctive attributes
     and characters of a Municipal Committee, District Board or Body of
     Port Commissioners, but, possessing one essential feature, namely
     that it is legally entitled to or entrusted bite Government with the
     control and management of a municipal or local fund. What then
     are the distinctive attributes and characteristics, all of many of
     which a Municipal Committee, District Board or Body of Port
     Commissioners shares with any other local authority? First, the
     authorities must have separate legal existence as corporate
     bodies. They must not be mere Government agencies but must be
     legally independently entities.      Next they must    function in a
     defined area and must ordinarily, wholly or partly, directly or
     indirectly be elected by the inhabitants of the area.      Next they
     must enjoy a certain degree of autonomy, with freedom to decide
     for themselves questions of policy affecting the area administered
     by them. The autonomy may not be complete and the degree of
     the dependence may vary considerably but an appreciable measure
     of autonomy there must be.         Next they must be entrusted by
     statute with such Governmental functions and duties as are usually
     entrusted to municipal bodies such as those connected with
     providing amenities to the inhabitants of the locality, like health
     and education services, water and sewerage, town planning and
     development , roads, markets, transportation, social welfare
     services, etc. etc. Broadly we may say that they maybe entrusted
     with the performance of civic duties and functions which would
     otherwise be Governmental duties and functions. Finally they must
     have the power to raise funds for the furtherance of their activities
     and the fulfillment of their projects by levying taxes, rates,
     charges or fees. This may be in addition to moneys provided by
     government or obtained by borrowing or otherwise.            What is
     essential is that control or management of the fund must vest in
     the authority."

The tests given in above para were further discussed by the

Assessing officer in para 7 which is as under:

     "7       Fur th er t h e H o n' b le A pex C our t in U ni o n of In d ia Vs . R .C . J ai n &
     O r s i n AI R 1 98 1 ( ) S . C) 9 5 1 hav e l a id d ow n f iv e t es ts f or d ec l ar i ng t he
     as s es s e e i n th e s t at us o f L oc a l A u th or ity w h i c h ar e as u nd er :

     "1         Th e a ut ho r i t ies m us t hav e s e p ar at e l e ga l e x is t e nc e as C or p or at e
     bo d i es .     Th ey m us t no t be m er e G ov er n me n t Ag e nc ies b ut mus t b e
     l eg a l ly i nd e pe n de n t en ti t it i es .

     B ut t he as s es s e e, C ha n d ig ar h Ho us i ng Bo ar d, is G ov er n m e nt
     un d er t ak i ng an d a b id e a l l G ov er nm e nt o r d er s a nd i ns tr uc t i o ns an d is
     pr im ar i ly d ep e nd e nt o n G ov t po l ic i es .

     2         Th ey m us t fu nc ti o n in a d ef i ne d ar e a an d mus t o r d i na r i ly , w ho l l y
     or p ar t ly d ir ec t ly or in d ir ec t ly b e e lec te d by th e i n ha b it a nts o f th e ar e a .

               No n e of t he f u nc t i on a r i es of t h e C h a nd i gar h Ho us i ng Bo ar d ar e
     e lec te d by t h e i nh a b it an ts o f th e ar ea a n d a ll t h e m em b er s ar e
     no m i na t ed by t h e G ov er n m e nt .
                                                  19

     3         Th ey mus t en j oy a c e r ta i n de gr ee o f au t on omy , w it h fr e e do m to
     dec i d e fo r th e ms el v es q ues t io ns o r po l ic y e ff ec ti n g; t h e ar ea
     ad m i n is t er e d by t he m . Th e a ut o no my ma y no t b e c o m p le te a nd th e
     de gr e e o f t he d ep e nd enc e may v ar y c ons i der a b ly b ut , an ap pr ec ia b le
     me as ur es of a u to n omy t her e m us t be .

             Th e as s es s e e- Ch a nd i gar h H o us i n g B o ar d is d e pe n de nt on th e
     G ov t po l ic ies an d h as to a b i de by al l t h e d ir e c ti o ns , e tc . of t he G ov t.

     4           Th ey mus t be e n tr u s te d by S ta tu t e w i th s uc h G ov e r n m en t al
     fu nc t i o ns an d d ut i es as ar e us ua l ly e ntr us t e d t o m u nic i p a l b od i es .
     Br oa d ly , th ey m ay b e en tr us t ed w it h t he per for m anc e o f c iv ic du t i es a nd
     fu nc t i o ns wh ic h wo u l d ot h er w is e b e gov er n m en t d ut i es a nd f u nc t i o ns .

               Th e as s es s ee- Ch a n di gar h Ho us in g B oar d h as n ot b ee n en tr us t ed
     th e fu nc ti o ns a nd d ut i es as ar e us u a l ly en tr us te d t o mu n ic i pa l bo d i es .
     Fur th er t he as s es s ee h as n ot b e en e nt r us te d w it h th e p er f or m a nc e o f
     c iv ic d u ti es an d fu nc t i ons w hic h wo u ld o th e r wis e by G ov er n m en t du t ies
     an d f unc t io ns .

     5           Fi na l ly t h ey m us t h av e t h e p ow er t o r a is e f u nds f or t h e
     fur th er a nc e o f t h e ir ac t iv it i es a nd t he f u l fi l l me n t of th e ir pr o j ec ts by
     l ev y i n g tax es , r at es , c har g es or fe es . T h is may b e i n a dd i t io n to mo n ey s
     pr ov i d ed by G ov er n m e nt or ob t ai n e d by b or r ow i ng or o th er w is e . W hat is
     es s e n ti a l is th a t c o nt r o l or ma n ag e m en t o f th e f un d m us t v es t i n th e
     au t hor i ty .

              Th e as s es s ee /C h a nd i g ar h H ous i n g Bo ar d is no t au t hor i ze d t o lev y
     any t ax es , r at es , c h ar ges or fe es wi t ho ut t h e p er m is s io n an d d ir e c ti o ns
     of t h e G ov er n m en t. "

From above it becomes clear that the assessee-Board does not

meet the criteria or the tests laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court for holding an organization as local authority. In view of this

decision, we are of the opinion that the assessee-board is not a

local authority and therefore liable to surcharge.                                  Accordingly we

find nothing wrong with the order of the Ld. CIT(A) dated 30.9.2013

through which the appeals of the assessee for Assessment year

2006-07 to 2009-10 have been dismissed and we confirm the same.

17   In the result, ITAs No. 1109, 1110, 1111 & 1112/Chd/2013 are

dismissed.

ITAs No. 1113, 1114, 1115 & 1116/Chd/2013

18   In    all    these       appeals         the      assessee          has      raised       following

common grounds:

     "1       Th at t h e L d. CI T( A) h as er r e d i n la w as w e ll as o n f ac ts o f t he
     c as e in u p ho l d in g t he ac t i on o f th e As s es s i n g of f ic er in p as s in g t h e or d er
     u/s 1 5 4.

     2       Th at t he L d . CIT( A) is n ot j us t if i ed i n u p ho l d in g th e or d er p as s e d
     by t h e As s es s i n g o ff i c er u/s 1 54 w hic h wa s pas s e d w i th o ut g iv i ng a ny
                                                    20

      no t ic e or an o pp or tu n ity of b e in g he ar d u /s 15 4( 3) o f I nc o me - ta x Ac t ,
      19 6 1 wh ic h ac ti o n is a ls o ag a i ns t t he pr inc i p l es of " N at ur a l J us t ic e ".

      3            Th at th e L d. CIT ( A ) has er r e d i n u p ho l d in g th e or d er o f t h e
      As s es s i n g o ff ic er b ec aus e a ny d e ba t ab l e i s s ue is i nc ap a b le of be i ng
      r ec t i fi e d u/s 15 4 , s uc h as `c h a ng e o f s ta tus '.

19    After hearing both the parties we find that after passing the

reassessment order the orders were taken up by way of rectification

order u/s 154.          Detailed discussion was made regarding status of

the assessee and reference was made to the order of Hon'ble

Supreme Court in case of U n i o n o f I n d i a V s . R . C . J a i n & O r s

(supra).      It was held that correct status of the assessee was

"Artificial Juridical Person" (in short AJP).

20    On appeal it was mainly contended that the order us/ 154 has

been passed without issuing a notice. It was further contended that

status of the assessee could not be changed by passing an order

u/s 154.

21    The Ld. CIT(A) observed that since there was no enhancement

in the tax levied on the assessee therefore in view of section 154(3)

no notice was required to be issued.                               The other contention that

status can not be changed u/s 154 was adjudicated as under:


      " T h e ar g um e nt of t h e L d. Co u ns e l f or t h e as s es s e e th a t t he c h an g e o f
      s ta tus w as n ot p os s i b le by p as s in g or d er u /s 15 4, s inc e i t was a
      de b at a bl e is s ue , a ls o do es no t h o l d w at er , s i nc e af te r o m is s io n o f s u b-
      c l aus e ( 20 A) of s ec 1 0, t h e a p pe l l an t c ou l d no t h av e b ee n as s es s ed as
      `l oc a l a ut h or ity ' a nd h ad t o b e as s es s e d as `ar t i fic i a l j ur id ic a l p er s on '.

22    Before us, the Ld. Counsel for the assessee submitted that

rectification order cannot be passed without issuing notice.                                         In this

regard he relied on the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case

of L. Hariday Narayan Vs. ITO, 78 ITR 26.

23    On the other hand, the Ld. D.R. for the Revenue submitted

that in fact the assessee itself moved a rectification application vide

application dated 6.5.2013 (copy of which is available at page 7 of

the paper book). She further submitted that in the order u/s 154 the
                                                   21


Assessing      officer      simply        determined            the     actual       status       of     the

assessee which does not have effect of enhancement tax liability of

the assessee and therefore as per the provisions of section 154(3)

no notice was required to be issued.                           Notice was required only if

rectification order would have effect of enhancing the liability of the

assessee.      For this she relied on the decision of Third Member of

Chandigarh Bench of the Tribunal in case of ACIT Vs. Sandeep

Khanna, 67 ITD 23.

24   W e have gone through the rival submissions carefully.                                             The

assessee has moved an application for rectification (copy of which

is available at page 7 of eh paper book). The application reads as

under:

     " Th e As s is t a nt C o m mi s s i on er o f Inc o me ­t ax
     Cir c l e 1( 1) , Ay ak ar Bh aw a n, S ec tor 17- E
     Ch a nd i ga r h
     S ir ,

              S ub j ec t : R e qu es t f or r ec t if ic at i o n o f m is t ak e a p pa r e nt fr om
              Rec or d u/s 1 5 4 in t h e c as e o f Ch a nd i g ar h H ous i ng Bo ar d, PA N
              A A AL C 0 1 23 H ) As s es s me n t y ea r 2 0 06- 0 7

     K in d ly r ef er t o t h e r e as s es s m e nt or d er f or th e a b ov e n ot e d As s e s s me n t
     y ear p as s e d by y our ho n ou r on 17 .1 2 .2 0 12 .

     1          It is r eq u es t e d t ha t i n t he a bov e s a id a s s es s m e nt or de r t he
     ap p l ic a n t h as b e en de t er mi n ed to b e a t ax ab l e e nt i ty a n d as s es s e d i n t he
     s ta tus o f `l o c a l a u th o r ity ' n o t be i n g a l oc a l a ut h or ity u /s 1 0( 2 0) wh os e
     i nc o m e is ex e mp t. So th e i nc om e o f th e a p pl ic an t is t ax a b l e.

     2           Th e t ax h as be e n c alc u la te d by a pp ly i ng t he r at es a pp l ic a bl e to a
     l oc a l a ut h or ity , bu t t he s ur c h ar ge h as a ls o be e n l ev i e d, w h ic h is n ot
     l ev i a b le i n t he c as e o f a loc a l a u th or ity . S o, y our h on o ur w o ul d agr e e
     th at it is a m is t ak e a pp ar e nt fr o m t h e r ec or ds w hic h r e qu ir es
     r ec t i fic a ti o n.

     It is , t h er e f or e r e q ues t ed t ha t th e a bov e m is t ak e b e in g a pp ar e nt fr o m t h e
     r ec o r ds , m ay k i nd ly b e r ec t if i ed .

     Y our s f a it h fu l ly ,
          S d /-
     ( A. K . S i n gh a l)
     Ch ar t er e d Ac c ou n ta nt , A .R
     For C ha n d ig ar h Ho us i ng Bo ar d "

From above it becomes clear that the assessee itself requested the

Assessing officer to determine the correct status.                                   The Assessing

officer took up the matter by way of rectification proceedings and
                                                    22


passed the order u/s 154 by holding that the status of the assessee

was "AJP".       Admittedly no notice has been issued to the assessee.

W e have no quarrel with the contention that no order can be passed

without    complying            with      the      principles          of     natural        justice       i.e.

opportunity must be given to the assessee before passing an order.

However, at the same time Sec 154(3) reads as under:

      " A n a me n d me nt , w h ic h h as th e e ff ec t of e nh a nc in g a n as s es s m en t or
      r ed uc i ng a r e fu n d or o th er w is e i nc r e as i ng t h e li a b i li ty of th e as s es s ee [ or
      th e d ed uc tor ], s h a l l n ot b e m a de u n der t h is s ec ti o n u nl es s t he au th or ity
      c onc er n ed h as g iv en no t ic e to t he as s es s ee [o r t he d ed uc tor ] of its
      i nt en t io n s o t o d o a n d h as a l l ow e d t he as s es s e e [ or t h e d e duc tor ] a
      r eas o n ab l e o pp or tu n it y o f b ei n g h ear d . "

The plain reading of the above provision clearly show that the

Assessing officer is required to issue a notice if the order which is

to be passed us/ 154, has effect of enhancing the assessment or tax

liability or reducing the refund to the assessee.                                 In fact in case of

Sandeep Khanna (supra) it was held by Third Member of Chandigarh

Bench of the Tribunal as under:

      " In th e c as e of CI T Vs . P a nk a j G u pt a ( 19 9 1) 18 8 I TR 18 4 , t he A l l a ha b ad
      Hi g h C ou r t obs er v ed th at s ec t i o n 1 54 ( 3) g iv es s t at ut or y s h a p e to t h e
      pr inc i p le of n a tur a l j u s tic e a n d a ny or der o f r ec t i f ic a t io n w h ic h h as th e
      ef fec t o f e nh a nc i n g the l ia b i l ity o f t he as s es s ee , p as s e d wi t ho ut
      c om p ly i ng w i th th e s a id r eq u ir em e nt is i nv a l i d i n l a w.             Th e ab ov e
      dec is i on s q u ar ely s u pp or te d th e Ac c o un t an t Me m b er 's v i ew .                T he
      pr ov is i o ns o f s ec t io n 15 4( 3) a r e m an d at or y in n at ur e a n d ar e m ea n t t o
      ens ur e t ha t n o or d er i s pas s ed to t h e d etr i me n t of th e as s es s ee wi t ho ut
      af for d i ng h is du e op p or t u ni ty of be i n g h e ar d. T h us , th e Co m m is s i on er
      ( A pp e a ls ) w as r i gh t i n c a nc e ll i n g t h e i nt er es t c ha r g e d fr o m t h e
      as s es s e e. "

Therefore it becomes clear that if an order is to be passed u/s 154

for enhancing the tax liability or reducing the refund due to

assessee then no notice is required to be issued. Therefore in our

opinion,     the     Assessing            officer        passed         the     rectification           order

correctly because he has only rectified the correct status of the

assessee through this order.                     W e may note that while adjudicating

the appeals in respect of                  reassessment order it was noted that in

the assessment order status of the assessee was shown "local

authority".      W e had noted that perhaps it was done by mistake or
                                          23


due to typographical mistake and that is why this order has been

passed.      Liability to pay tax as surcharge got determined through

reassessment order passed by the Assessing officer u/s 147 r.w.s.

143(3)      on   17.12.2012    for all    the   four Assessment     years   i.e.

Assessment year 2006-07 to 2009-10.                 Through this order the

assessee was held to be a local authority and surcharge was levied.

Therefore it becomes clear that through rectification order only the

correct nomenclature of status of the assessee has bee determined

and no fresh liability has been imposed on the assessee.

25     In view of the above, we uphold the order of the Ld. CIT(A).

26     In the result, ITAs No. 1113,1114, 1115 & 1116/Chd/2013 are

dismissed.

27     In    the    result,   all   the   appeals   of   the    assessee    are

dismissed.

       Order pronounced in the open court on 27.3.2014

                 Sd/-                                    Sd/-

     (SUSHMA CHOWLA)                                (T.R. SOOD)
      JUDICI AL MEMBER                          ACCOUNTANT MEMBER


Dated : 27.3.2014

SURESH

Copy to: The Appellant/The Respondent/The CIT/The CIT(A)/The DR

 
 
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